The Relationship between Aesthetic Value and Cognitive Value by Aumann, Antony
Northern Michigan University 
NMU Commons 
Journal Articles FacWorks 
2014 
The Relationship between Aesthetic Value and Cognitive Value 
Antony Aumann 
Northern Michigan University, aaumann@nmu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.nmu.edu/facwork_journalarticles 
 Part of the Aesthetics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Aumann, Antony, "The Relationship between Aesthetic Value and Cognitive Value" (2014). Journal 
Articles. 87. 
https://commons.nmu.edu/facwork_journalarticles/87 
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the FacWorks at NMU Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NMU Commons. For more information, 
please contact kmcdonou@nmu.edu,bsarjean@nmu.edu. 
The Relationship between Aesthetic Value and Cognitive Value 
It is sometimes held that “the aesthetic” and “the cognitive” are separate categories.1 
Enterprises concerning the former and ones concerning the latter have different aims. They 
require distinct modes of attention and reward divergent kinds of appreciation.  
This position has its detractors.2 The typical line of objection is to argue that 
cognitive values can bear upon aesthetic ones. Works of art and literature can disclose 
important truths about the world; they can teach us in non-trivial ways. Moreover, their 
doing so often contributes to their aesthetic merits. 
I, too, reject the independence or autonomy of aesthetic and cognitive categories. 
However, I seek to develop a radically different defense of this position, one that inverts the 
traditional strategy. I aim to show that a work’s aesthetic merits can bear upon its cognitive 
ones.3 
To build my case, I will focus on a very specific set of works, namely philosophical 
texts. The relationship between aesthetic value and cognitive value that I hope to establish is 
most readily apparent here. I believe that what I will say can be generalized to other kinds of 
texts, including works of literature, as well as to other kinds of artifacts, including paintings 
and sculptures. However, I will not defend the generalization in this paper.  
1. Definitions 
Some definitions are in order. First, I will take “aesthetic value” to refer to that which makes 
an object worthy or unworthy of being perceived, contemplated, or otherwise appreciated 
for its own sake.4 Accordingly, I will not consider it to encompass merely those aspects of an 
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object productive of sensory pleasure or its opposite, such as beauty, gracefulness, elegance, 
and their contraries. I will treat it as circumscribing a broader range of features including 
what Noël Carroll calls expressive properties (somber, melancholic, gay, bold, stately, 
pompous), Gestalt properties (unified, balanced, tightly knit, chaotic), taste properties 
(gaudy, vulgar, kitschy, garish), and reaction properties (sublime, beautiful, comic, 
suspenseful).5 
I will exclude from the purview of my investigation aesthetic value properties that 
are cognitive in nature, such as being profound, insightful, true, or misleading. Incorporating 
them into the discussion would render my thesis trivial. Aesthetic values would obviously 
bear on cognitive values because some of them would be cognitive values.6 
Second, when I turn to cognitive values themselves, I will focus on a proper subset 
of them, namely those we might call philosophical values. Doing otherwise would once again 
diminish the interest of my thesis. The general category of cognitive value includes such 
things as instructional, educational, or pedagogical value. There is nothing novel about 
trumpeting the importance of aesthetic considerations in these arenas. Horace made the 
point millennia ago.7 Texts that move us or that display eloquence and wit more often hit 
home. We more frequently remember them, incorporate their conclusions into our web of 
beliefs, and integrate their ideas into our deliberations. To take but one example, the beauty 
of Descartes’s writing repeatedly draws us back to his Meditations. Time and again it leads us 
to consider claims made in this work that we otherwise might have forgotten long ago. 
What, then, is philosophical value such that attention to it possesses greater interest? 
We can begin by noting that philosophical texts aim inter alia at truth.8 Accordingly, part of 
their value qua philosophical texts—i.e. part of their philosophical value—consists in 
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whether they achieve this goal. Another sizable portion concerns how well they support the 
truths they proclaim. Indeed, the strength of a text’s arguments is likely the most decisive 
measure of its philosophical merit. Of course, other considerations deserve mention as well, 
such as the internal consistency of the text and its contribution to topics of perennial interest 
to the philosophical community. Although not exhaustive, this list is sufficiently informative 
for our purposes.9 
The foregoing account of philosophical value might appear to undercut my position. 
We might wonder how it could matter to our philosophical assessment of a work whether it 
exhibited great literary eloquence, profoundly moved us on an emotional level, or contained 
that high level of implicit meaning known as “semantic density.” Indeed, of what philosophical 
importance could it be whether the prose of a text was lifeless, serene, dynamic, vulgar, or 
vivid? Such considerations look irrelevant to the strength of a work’s arguments, its internal 
consistency, or the truth of its conclusions. Claiming otherwise seems to involve a category 
mistake. 
Nevertheless, I will defend the counterintuitive line. I will argue that the aesthetic 
value of a text can bear upon the philosophical value of a text. That is not to say that it 
always does so, or that it is ever the sole determining factor, only that it sometimes does so 
and to some degree. 
2. Clarifications 
In principle, aesthetic value could bear upon cognitive value in two ways. First, some 
aesthetic values might metaphysically constitute cognitive values. Possession of them could be 
commendatory or pejorative in a cognitive sense. Berys Gaut cites profundity and 
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insightfulness as potential examples.10 Second, the presence of some aesthetic values might 
help epistemically ground judgments about cognitive value. The fact that a work has them could 
figure into the reasons for giving a positive or negative assessment of the work’s cognitive 
merit.  
I shall proceed along the latter front. I will argue that aesthetic values can bear upon 
cognitive values by epistemically grounding claims about their presence or absence in a 
particular work. 
Aesthetic values supervene on aesthetic properties.11 Such supervenience takes two 
forms.12 First, some aesthetic properties are themselves evaluative. They are bearers of 
aesthetic value or that in which aesthetic value resides. To say an object has one of these 
properties is in part to say the object is to some degree aesthetically good or bad.13 For 
example, to describe a work as sublime, moving, or bold is normally to appraise it positively. 
To call it dreary, derivative, or boring is typically to assess it negatively.14 
Second, some aesthetic properties are not evaluative but are nonetheless relevant to 
aesthetic value. They figure into our explanations of why an object warrants a particular 
aesthetic value judgment.15 For instance, to describe the pace of a novel as fast is not usually 
to evaluate it. Yet, we might point to the fact that a novel is fast-paced to account for why 
we call it gripping, which would be an evaluative comment.  
I will focus on aesthetic properties that are themselves evaluative. I do not merely 
wish to show that a work’s aesthetic properties bear upon its philosophical value but that its 
aesthetic value does so.16 
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3. False Starts 
The following observation provides a tempting point of departure. When assessing 
philosophical texts, we often raise considerations that fall into a category that overlaps with 
aesthetics, namely stylistics. We praise or disparage works because they possess or lack 
properties such as clarity, succinctness, awkwardness, and eloquence. We include “well-
written,” or its opposite, in referee reports and in comments on student papers. The 
existence of such vocabulary in our critical practices suggests stylistic considerations (and so 
perhaps aesthetic ones) may affect philosophical value. After all, some scholars cite the 
appearance of cognitive vocabulary in art criticism as evidence that cognitive values 
influence aesthetic ones.17 Why should not something of the reverse hold as well? 
We must tread carefully here. The fact that an evaluative judgment concerns a 
philosophical work does not thereby make it a judgment about the philosophical value of 
that work. The reasons for the judgment matter.18 For example, if I extol William Irwin’s The 
Simpsons and Philosophy because it made a large sum of money, or if I laud Plato’s Republic 
because it helped shape the western world, my evaluations are not philosophical in nature. In 
neither case am I concerned with the truth of the work’s content, the strength of its 
arguments, its internal consistency, etc. The same point might hold for assessments based on 
stylistic considerations. Although frequently made of philosophical works, they might reveal 
nothing about these works’ philosophical value. At least, we would need additional reasons 
before ruling out this possibility. Thus, we cannot conclude from the mere existence of 
stylistic vocabulary in criticisms of philosophical writing that stylistic value (and so perhaps 
aesthetic value) bears upon philosophical value. 
6 
 
A second observation might afford better initial footing. We might defend the idea 
that aesthetic value can influence philosophical value by noting that we esteem some 
philosophical texts as highly as we do precisely because of their aesthetic merits. For 
instance, Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” 
probably would not occupy such lofty places in the canon were it not for their incomparable 
wit. Augustine’s Confessions likely would attract fewer readers were it less moving. Finally, 
Austin’s “Truth” might have received less attention had it not contained so many quotable 
passages.19 
Conceding the accuracy of these conjectures, what follows? Not much. They indicate 
the philosophical community cares about more than just philosophical matters. They also 
suggest some texts have aesthetic and philosophical value. However, neither point in itself 
entails that aesthetic value affects philosophical value. 
4. Implications of Aesthetic Properties 
How, then, to proceed? Perhaps the best way is with the notion that a text’s aesthetic 
properties can implicitly express statements and claims. This idea is not new, having been 
suggested by Martha Nussbaum,20 Peter Kivy,21 and others.22 However, it lacks a robust 
defense. I will provide one here.   
First, note that works of literature typically prompt us to adopt the point of view of 
the (presumed) narrator. When reading Camus’s The Stranger, we find ourselves looking at the 
world through the eyes of Mersault. The pages of Dickens’s Copperfield draw us into the title 
character’s perspective on life. Finally, the power of Nabokov’s Lolita lies in its ability to 
make us empathize with Humbert Humbert.  
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Something different happens when reading philosophical texts. We do not 
automatically enter into the (presumed) author’s world. We do not extend him or her the 
same leeway regarding the facts. Instead, we interrogate each word and sentence. We 
demand justifications for every assertion.  
The difference in our reactions is partly due to genre expectations. But style, structure, 
and tone also play a role. Take Spinoza’s Ethics. It proceeds in an abstract, impersonal, and 
dispassionate manner. These features keep us at arm’s length from Spinoza, the man. They 
force us to concentrate on the ideas he puts forth. Moreover, the text’s geometric feel 
encourages us to submit it to the same cold, logical analysis we would a mathematical 
proof.23 Alternatively, consider the dialogues of Plato, Berkeley, and Hume. The characters 
in them challenge and question each other’s views. We find ourselves caught up in the 
process. Transformed into judges of an imaginary debate, we scrutinize the merits of each 
new argument we encounter. 
These examples show how the formal properties of a philosophical text can influence 
our approach to its content. A work’s aesthetic properties can perform a similar function.24 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals illustrates the point. The Genealogy is a moving, provocative, 
and even disturbing book. Conspicuous in this regard is the passage describing the journey 
of Mr. Rash and Curious into the workshop where Judeo-Christian ideals are made.25 The 
scene comes across as something out of a horror movie. The workshop is dark and 
foreboding. Soft muttering and whispering emanate from hidden nooks and crannies. 
Noxious air overcomes Mr. Rash and Curious; he struggles to contain his stomach. His 
unease and disgust are contagious; they wash over us. The feelings we thereby acquire shape 
how we perceive the workshop’s secrets.26 They glue our attention to the unnerving aspects 
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of Mr. Rash and Curious’s discoveries. Thus, when he reports that Judeo-Christian values are 
the product of lies and deception, his message strikes a chord: 
—“They are miserable, no doubt of it, all these mutterers and nook counterfeiters, 
although they crouch warmly together—but they tell me their misery is a sign of be-
ing chosen by God; one beats the dogs one likes the best; perhaps this misery is also 
a preparation, a testing, a schooling, perhaps it is even more—something that will 
one day be made good and recompensed with interested, with huge payments of 
gold, no! of happiness. This they call ‘bliss.’” 
—Go on! 
—“Now they give me to understand that they are not merely better than the mighty, 
the lords of the earth whose spittle they have to lick (not from fear, not at all from 
fear! but because God has commanded them to obey the authorities)—that they are 
not merely better but are also ‘better off,’ or at least will be better off someday. But 
enough! enough! I can’t take any more. Bad air! Bad air! This workshop where ideals 
are manufactured—it seems to me it stinks of so many lies.”27 
The fact that a text’s aesthetic properties can influence us in this way underwrites their 
ability to imply claims. The reasoning here falls roughly within the domain of pragmatics. 
When engaging with others, we assume they will act cooperatively.28 In part this means we 
expect them to encourage or direct us only in appropriate ways. We presume they will urge 
us to do only what they believe suits the circumstances. Thus, when an interlocutor prompts 
us to pursue a specific course of action, we take it that he or she believes the course of 
9 
 
action is appropriate.29 In other words, the conventional implication of a person’s directive is 
that he or she believes what he or she pushes us to do is somehow fitting. 
5. Analogies 
That directives give rise to implications is most obvious when the directives take explicit 
verbal form. Everyday conversation bears this out. Suppose that while working on a 
construction site, I shout to my coworker, “Pass me your hammer.” The implications of my 
command include that I want my coworker’s hammer and think it appropriate for her to 
hand it to me. Or suppose that while sitting in a pub with an empty beer mug in my hand, I 
call to the bartender, “Bring me another.” My order implies that I desire an additional beer 
and find it fitting for the bartender to pour me one. 
However, there is no need to limit the discussion to the spoken or written word. 
Consider that non-verbal gestures can also function as directives.30 Pointing to my 
coworker’s hammer while we work next to each other on a noisy construction site conveys 
roughly the same message as shouting at her to hand it over. Suggestively shaking an empty 
beer mug in the bartender’s sight line is more or less equivalent to verbally requesting one 
more. These directive gestures generate the same implications as their spoken counterparts. 
Pointing to the hammer in my coworker’s hand implies that I want it and believe she should 
pass it to me. Suggestively shaking an empty mug at the bartender implies not only that I 
want another beer but that I find it fitting for the bartender to provide it for me. 
I believe that the aesthetic properties of some texts are analogous to such non-verbal 
gestures. They too function as directives: They prompt readers to approach the semantic 
content of the text in a particular way. And they get readers to view the text’s subject matter 
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with a certain attitude or to see it from a certain perspective. Consequently, they too 
engender implications.  
Returning to the Genealogy brings out the point. Nietzsche drives us to engage this 
text in a heightened emotional state by writing in a shrill and strident manner. It follows that 
Nietzsche wants our emotions to be aroused when we read the Genealogy and that he believes 
such arousal is integral to accomplishing the books’ goals. Indeed, were Nietzsche not of this 
mindset, we would have trouble understanding why he wrote in the manner he did. 
6. Implicatures, Presuppositions, and Entailments 
Implications of the kind I have been discussing arise partly because of a pragmatic 
consideration. We must believe the implications in order to make sense of what the speaker 
or author is saying or doing. We must assume their truth in order to interpret the person 
issuing the directive as engaged in cooperative and rational behavior. 
In this section, I will develop a more formal account of such implications, one that 
will enable us to calculate precisely what implications will be generated by a given sentence, 
speech act, gesture, or aesthetic property. To do so, I will compare them with three related 
phenomena: (1) Gricean implicatures, (2) presuppositions, and (3) entailments.  
6.1. Implicatures 
Conversational implicatures refer to the act of meaning one thing by saying or writing 
another. For example, in the right context, one implicates a request to open the window by 
uttering, “It is hot in here.” By asserting, “Jones ate some of the cookies,” a person implicates 
the additional proposition that Jones did not eat all the cookies. Finally, by touting Smith’s 
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penmanship in a letter of recommendation for employment as a philosophy professor, one 
implicates that Smith is under-qualified. 
Grice maintains that conversational implicatures arise in part because we must 
suppose their truth to understand the speaker or author as behaving cooperatively.31 Thus 
they bear some similarity to the phenomenon I have in mind. However, Grice also describes 
implicatures as having the peculiar feature of being cancellable.32 It is possible to revoke or 
overturn them without rendering the original statement incoherent. For instance, as noted, 
“John ate some of the cookies” implicates that John did not eat all of them. But no 
confusion arises if this implicature is repudiated. It would be perfectly acceptable to say, 
“John ate some of the cookies; in fact, he ate all of them.” 
Implications of the sort I have been describing lack this property. Their cancellation 
leads to absurdity. It would be incongruous for someone to instruct a coworker, “Pass me 
your hammer,” and follow this up by adding, “But it would be inappropriate for you to do 
so.” The same point holds in situations where the directive takes the form of a gesture rather 
than an utterance. Suggestively waving a now empty beer mug in front of the bartender 
while saying “I don’t want any more” would make little sense. 
Of course, it is possible to tell someone to pass the hammer while believing he or 
she should not do so. It is also possible to order another beer despite not wanting one. But 
such speech acts are defective. It is not in keeping with the expectation of cooperative 
behavior to direct people to do something without believing they should do it or without 




Presuppositions might seem a better fit than implicatures. Roughly speaking, presuppositions 
are propositions a speaker or author seems to take for granted in uttering or writing a 
sentence.33 They are “taken for granted” in the sense that they are not part of the content of 
the original statement but their truth is a precondition of the statement’s felicity. In other 
words, if the speaker or author did not assume the truth of these propositions, what he or 
she said or wrote would somehow be inappropriate. To use two shopworn examples, saying 
“The present king of France is bald” presupposes the proposition, “There is a present king 
of France.” And asking “Have you stopped beating your wife?” presupposes you have a wife 
and have been beating her. 
One defining trait of presuppositions is their ability to project from embeddings.34 
Unlike conversational implicatures, they typically arise even when the statement triggering 
them is nested within an operator such as negation. For instance, “It is not the case that the 
present king of France is bald” also presupposes France currently has a king. So too do the 
following sentences: “If the present king of France is bald, I’ll eat my hat”; “The president 
thinks the present king of France is bald”; and, “Did you know that the present king of 
France is bald?” 
The ability to project from embeddings distinguishes presuppositions from the 
phenomenon to which I have been attending. If I tell you to pass me the hammer, I do take 
for granted that I want the hammer and that I find it fitting for you to give it to me. My 
directive would be infelicitous (because insincere or not genuine) were these things not true. 
But the propositions “I want the hammer” and “I believe it is appropriate for you to pass me 
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the hammer” are not presupposed if the original directive is embedded in an operator such 
as negation. They are not implied by someone who declares, “Do not pass me the hammer.” 
Nor are they assumed by a person who says any of the following: “The foreman thinks you 
should pass me the hammer”; “If you pass me the hammer, I will not know what to do with 
it”; or, “Do you think it is wise to pass me the hammer?”35 
6.3. Entailments 
Failure of both projection and cancellation brings the phenomena I have in mind closest to a 
third kind of implication, namely entailment. However, they are not entailments of a logical 
sort. Logical entailments relate in a truth-functional fashion to their trigger statements. To 
wit, p logically entails q if and only if q is true whenever p is true. This formula does not fit 
the implications I have been discussing. The triggers in my examples are directives, and 
directives lack truth conditions. Commands such as “Pass me the hammer” and requests 
such as “Bring me another beer” are not the sort of statements that can be true or false. The 
same point holds a fortiori for aesthetic properties that serve directive functions. It is a 
category mistake to claim that being shocking or moving, for instance, is true or false. 
Returning to the domain of pragmatics allows us to accommodate this point. Instead 
of talking about truth conditions, we can talk about felicity conditions—i.e. the conditions 
under which an act is performed successfully and non-defectively.36 Commands, requests, 
instructions, and the like do possess these. For example, we say that a person gives advice in 
a successful and non-defective fashion only if he or she thinks the advised course of action 
will help the advisee.37   
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We can use felicity conditions to construct an account of pragmatic entailments. Loosely 
speaking, the idea is that statements, gestures, etc. pragmatically entail their felicity 
conditions.38 More formally, p pragmatically entails q if and only if q is true whenever p is 
felicitous.39 For example, Professor Brown’s believing that taking Introduction to Philosophy 
is beneficial for Sam is a felicity condition on Brown’s advising Sam to enroll in the course. 
Brown’s advice would be defective (because insincere) if she did not hold this belief. 
Therefore, the pragmatic entailment of Brown’s advice is that she believes Sam will benefit 
from a semester of philosophy. 
It bears repeating that we need not limit ourselves to linguistic utterances here. 
Directives spawn pragmatic entailments regardless of the form they take. Suggestively 
shaking my now empty beer mug at the bartender pragmatically entails “I want a beer” and 
“I find it fitting for the bartender to bring me one” in exactly the same way as uttering the 
command, “Pour me another.” Similarly, Nietzsche’s writing in a shrill and strident style 
pragmatically entails that he wants his reader’s emotions aroused and believes they should be 
aroused just as much as if he had opened the Genealogy with the explicit instruction, “Engage 
this text on an emotional level.” 
7. The Question of Scope 
Just how often do a philosophical text’s aesthetic properties imply claims? As the forgoing 
account indicates, the answer depends on how often they function as directives. I believe 
they do so more often than it seems. In fact, they almost always do so in the sense that they 
almost always prompt us to view the text’s subject matter with a certain attitude or in a 
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certain light. I defended this line of argument earlier with respect to texts that have 
conspicuous aesthetic features, such as Nietzsche’s Genealogy. I will now extend it farther.  
Consider some of the least likely cases, philosophical journal articles in the analytic 
tradition. We seldom read these texts with an eye toward their aesthetic properties. We rarely 
dwell on their aesthetic merits. Thus it is tempting to believe they do not have any of either, 
or at least not any of note. But it is possible to consider such works from an aesthetic point 
of view. We can set aside our interest in their philosophical merits in order to submit them 
to aesthetic analysis. When we do, we discover there is much to say. 
In terms of their tone, philosophical journal articles are typically serious and stately 
rather than offensive, jubilant, or melancholic. Their diction tends to be formal rather than 
vulgar and profane. It is also usually precise and literal rather than vague, suggestive, or 
metaphorical. Analytic journal articles tend to be tightly knit and systematic in their 
organization rather than chaotic, diffuse, and fragmentary. Finally, their authorial voice is 
almost always distant and impersonal. Only in exceptional cases is it passionate or intimate. 
Although we may not realize it, all of these properties affect us. They lead us to 
consider the content of the underlying work from a particular perspective or to adopt a 
specific attitude toward it. The dignified and stately tone of philosophy journal articles 
prompts us to take their theses seriously instead of treating them as fodder for amusement. 
Their exact and technical language engages the analytic parts of our minds. It gets us to think 
about the subject in question carefully and logically. Finally, the impersonal voice employed 
by their authors subtly encourages us to set aside our personal concerns and reflect on the 
claims being made in an unbiased fashion. 
16 
 
Because the aesthetic properties of philosophical texts in the analytic tradition have 
these effects on us, because they direct us in these ways, they imply claims: We ought to 
approach them seriously and objectively. We should engage their content with the rational 
parts of our minds. And we should trace the flow of their ideas closely and carefully. 
As argued in previous sections, what generates these implications is a pragmatic 
consideration. We must suppose the authors of analytic philosophy journal articles assume 
or believe that a serious-minded and logical approach to their work is appropriate in order to 
make sense of the aesthetic properties they give their works. More precisely, we need this 
supposition to explain how their use of a dignified tone, precise diction, a systematic 
structure, and an impersonal voice constitutes rational and cooperative behavior. We would 
be flummoxed by someone who penned an article in such a style but hoped to evoke a 
deeply emotional response or a flippant reaction. We would be inclined to think that the 
person was incompetent or obtuse, not rational and cooperative. 
8. Aesthetic Properties and Philosophical Value 
An argument is now in the offing for my general thesis that a text’s aesthetic properties can 
affect its philosophical value. As we have seen, a text’s aesthetic properties can imply 
statements or claims. But these claims need not align with those that comprise the text’s 
explicit semantic content. The former can say one thing, the latter something else. These two 
sets of claims can contradict each other.40 Such a contradiction is a philosophical defect; it 
compromises the consistency of the text as a whole. In this way, possessing the wrong 
aesthetic properties can detract from a text’s philosophical value. By the same token, 
possessing the right aesthetic properties can support the philosophical value of a text. If the 
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implications of a text’s aesthetic properties coincide with its explicit content, the consistency 
of the text is upheld. 
A thought experiment illustrates the point. Imagine an alternative version of 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy. Suppose it contains all the explicit content of the original work. It 
includes the idea from the First Essay that the values of meekness and humility were initially 
promoted by oppressed peoples as a subtle way to attack their rich and powerful masters. It 
makes the claim found in the Second Essay that guilt is the result of a pent up drive for 
cruelty. But, most importantly for our purposes, it contains the thesis located in the middle 
of the Third Essay about acquiring moral knowledge: In order to fully appreciate moral 
truths, such as those forwarded in the Genealogy, 41 we must engage them emotionally. If we 
approach them in a wholly dispassionate manner, our understanding of them will be 
impoverished.42 
Now suppose also that our imaginary text differs from Nietzsche’s actual one in 
terms of its aesthetic properties. It is not written in a shrill and strident style. It is neither 
moving, nor shocking, nor unsettling. Rather, it proceeds in a dispassionate manner 
reminiscent of Spinoza’s Ethics. It only addresses its readers’ intellects. It only arouses those 
aspects of their minds devoted to abstract reasoning. In sum, it rephrases in an emotionally 
neutral fashion all of the claims and arguments contained in the Genealogy. 
The imaginary work suffers from the following problem. On the one hand, the fact 
that it proceeds in a dispassionate fashion implies that a dispassionate approach to its 
content is fitting. We need not engage our emotions to grasp the truths—including the 
moral truths—it defends. On the other hand, the imaginary work explicitly states that a 
dispassionate approach to moral truths is inappropriate. Acquisition of moral knowledge 
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requires activation of the emotions. Thus, the work is internally inconsistent. One of the 
claims implied by its aesthetic properties contradict one of the claims that comprise its 
explicit semantic content.  
The reason for this contradiction deserves emphasis. It arises because of the 
aesthetic makeup of the imaginary text. More specifically, it stems from the fact that the 
imaginary text lacks the very aesthetic properties that makes Nietzsche’s text aesthetically 
valuable, namely its ability to move, shock and unsettle.43 If the imaginary text had these 
aesthetic properties, it would be internally consistent.  
To summarize, the decrease in aesthetic value that occurs when moving from the real 
text to the imaginary one results in a decrease in philosophical value. In particular, the value 
of internal consistency or coherence is lost. Conversely, the increase in aesthetic value that 
occurs when moving in the opposite direction results in an increase in philosophical value.44 
To wit, the value of consistency is gained. 
9. Aesthetic Value and Philosophical Value 
We can now draw some conclusions about the relationship between aesthetic value and 
philosophical value. I have shown that a text’s aesthetic value properties can imply 
philosophical claims. These implicit claims can stand in various logical relationships with the 
text’s explicit content. They can entail the truth or falsehood of any part of it. Consequently, 
their presence can uphold or undermine the consistency of the text. In both scenarios, the 
text’s aesthetic value affects its philosophical value. 
Three cautionary notes are in order. First, the claims implied by a text’s aesthetic 
properties can also be logically irrelevant to its semantic content. It is possible for them to 
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entail neither the truth nor the falsehood of anything the text explicitly says. In such cases, 
the text’s aesthetic properties might have no bearing on its philosophical value. 
Second, the properties that positively affect a text’s philosophical value need not be 
aesthetically meritorious. Just as there is bad art and bad literature, so too are there negative 
aesthetic value properties. Moreover, if properties with a positive valence can contribute to 
philosophical value, as in the case of Nietzsche’s Genealogy, so too can those with a negative 
valence. There may be cases where the literary equivalent of Socrates’s ugly visage 
contributes to the coherence of the text.45 Consequently, even when aesthetic value does 
bear upon philosophical value, the correlation will not necessarily be direct. 
Third, aesthetic value has only limited impact on philosophical value. The latter 
consists in a plurality of things, from the truth of the claims made by a text, to the degree of 
support it provides for these claims, to the influence of its arguments on perennial 
philosophical problems, to its overall consistency, etc. Aesthetic properties do not bear on all 
of these considerations. And for those it does affect, it is not the only relevant factor. 
Consistency, for example, is not simply a matter of the relationship between the claims 
implied by a text’s aesthetic properties and those that comprise its explicit semantic content. 
Even accounting for these three caveats, the following conclusion holds. In some 
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